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Research in healthy controls has found that mood influences cognitive processing via level of action
identification: happy moods are associated with global and abstract processing; sad moods are
associated with local and concrete processing. However, this pattern seems inconsistent with the high
level of abstract processing observed in depressed patients, leading Watkins (2008, 2010) to
hypothesise that the association between mood and level of goal/action identification is impaired in
depression. We tested this hypothesis by measuring level of identification on the Behavioural
Identification Form after happy and sad mood inductions in never-depressed controls and currently
depressed patients. Participants used increasingly concrete action identifications as they became
sadder and less happy, but this effect was moderated by depression status. Consistent with Watkins’
(2008) hypothesis, increases in sad mood and decreases in happiness were associated with shifts
towards the use of more concrete action identifications in never-depressed individuals, but not in
depressed patients. These findings suggest that the putatively adaptive association between mood and
level of identification is impaired in major depression.
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The hypothesis that goals, events, and actions can
be mentally represented within a hierarchical
framework that ranges from more abstract to
more concrete levels of identification is an
important concept within a number of social-
cognitive theories (e.g., control theory, Carver &
Scheier, 1982, 1990; Powers, 1973; construal
level theory, Trope & Liberman, 2003; action
identification theory, Vallacher & Wegner,
1987). The conceptualisation of abstract versus
concrete that is common to all of these theories is
that an abstract level of identification involves
general, superordinate, and decontextualised
mental representations that convey the essential
meaning of goals and events, including the ‘‘why’’
aspects of an action and the ends consequential to
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it. In contrast, a concrete level of identification
involves subordinate, contextual, and specific
details of goal, events, and actions that denote
the feasibility, mechanics, and means of ‘‘how’’ to
do the action.1 Control-theory approaches hy-
pothesise that goals, events, and behaviours are
hierarchically organised and can be processed at
different levels of abstraction, with more abstract,
superordinate goals and standards guiding and
informing more concrete, subordinate goals and
standards (Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1990, 1998;
Powers, 1973). Similarly, within action identifi-
cation theory (AIT; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987),
an abstract identification represents the purpose
and ends of an action (‘‘why it is carried out’’),
whereas a concrete identification represents the
action’s process and means (‘‘how it is carried
out’’). Thus, within AIT, the same action (e.g.,
‘‘locking my door’’) can be identified in abstract
terms (e.g., ‘‘maintaining security’’, the purpose
why the door is locked, i.e., a higher level in the
goal hierarchy) or in more concrete terms (e.g.,
‘‘turning a key’’, the means how the action is
implemented, i.e., a lower level in the goal
hierarchy).
Control theory and AIT, as well as recent
elaborations on these theories (Watkins, 2008,
2010) generate a number of hypotheses concern-
ing the relationship between level of goal/action
identification and affect. First, these theories
propose that the prepotent and active level of
goal/action identification can shift moment to
moment as a function of whether the individual is
focusing on a more abstract or more concrete level
of processing (Carver & Scheier, 1982). Second,
these theories propose that there is an optimal
level of identification that varies with circum-
stances including mood state (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987), such that it can be detrimental
to adopt a level of identification that is too
concrete, too abstract, or that fails to link abstract
levels to concrete levels (Carver & Scheier, 1998).
Thus, these theories propose that for the psycho-
logically healthy, shifts in level of goal/action
identification occur adaptively in response to
circumstances in order to match the level of
identification with the needs of the current
situation, whereas psychopathology is charac-
terised by inappropriate or inflexible identifica-
tions. Third, these theories hypothesise that
different levels of goal/action identifications
have distinct functional effects, with abstract
identifications aiding long-term goal pursuit, and
concrete identifications more adaptive in difficult
circumstances.
More specifically, these theories predict that
the level of goal/action identification adopted will
causally influence emotional response to a negative
event, with more concrete identifications resulting
in less emotional reactivity than abstract identifi-
cations (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Consistent with
this prediction, Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds
(2008) found that prior practice at adopting
concrete identifications resulted in less negative
1 Because the terms abstract and concrete are used multifariously (and often vaguely) in psychology (and in lay speech), it is
useful to define exactly what is meant by abstract versus concrete identifications in the current analysis. The current analysis is
grounded within control theory and action identification theory, and, as such, the current analysis operationalises more abstract
identifications as those representing superordinate goals including the purpose, meanings, and ends of a goal or action (‘‘why it is
carried out’’), and more concrete identifications as those representing subordinate goals including the process and means of a goal or
action (‘‘how it is carried out’’). Level of goal/action identification was chosen as the operationalisation of abstraction because: (a)
the current analysis is grounded within control theory/action identification accounts and level of goal/action identification is the
primary feature of abstract versus concrete processing within this theoretical approach; (b) means versus ends is the
operationalisation of abstractness that is common to all the theoretical perspectives considered; and (c) there are advantages in
clarity, parsimony, and theoretical rigour in adopting a narrow and specific operationalisation of abstraction. Moreover, it is
important to note that the distinction between abstract and concrete levels of representation used here differs from accounts in
which concrete levels of representation are associated with ‘‘hot’’ emotionally arousing representations, whereas abstract levels of
representation are associated with ‘‘cool’’, less arousing representations (Ayduk, Mischel, & Downey, 2002; Kross, Ayduk, &
Mischel, 2005, who report that distanced, non-emotionally immersed processing can be adaptive when focused on anger; see
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999, for a theoretical account). The level of identification accounts discussed here do not make links between
level of processing and emotional arousal, rather degree of emotional arousal/distance is conceptualised as a separate dimension.
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emotional response to a subsequent unexpected
failure than prior practice at adopting abstract
identifications. Elaborations on these theories
(Watkins, 2008, 2010) also hypothesise that
mood state will causally influence the level of
identification adopted, with sad mood leading to
adoption of more concrete identifications relative
to happy mood. There is not scope in the current
article to provide a detailed account of the
rationale behind all these hypotheses*a full
account is provided in Watkins (2008, 2010).
Within these theories, the potential advantages
and disadvantages of an abstract versus concrete
level of identification centre around their relative
sensitivity to contextual and situational detail.
Relative to a concrete level of identification, an
abstract identification insulates an individual from
the specific context, making the individual less
distractible, less impulsive, and enabling more
consistency and stability of goal pursuit across
time, but also making the individual less respon-
sive to the environment and to any situational
change, and providing fewer specific guides to
action and problem solving because of their
distance from the mechanics of action. Thus,
control theory and AIT generate the hypothesis
that under circumstances that are safe, familiar,
and straightforward or that require focus on long-
term goals, an abstract level of identification is
adaptive, as it enables stability and flexibility in
goal pursuit, whereas a concrete level of goal/
action identification is hypothesised to be adaptive
under circumstances of complexity, unfamiliarity,
difficulty, or stress, because it facilitates detailed
guidance as to what to do next.
Moreover, since control theory accounts hy-
pothesise that mood is a function of relative goal
progress, with negative versus positive affect
resulting from less versus greater progress towards
a goal than desired and expected (Carver &
Scheier, 1990), it is hypothesised that an adaptive
response to negative affect would be associated
with a shift to a more concrete level of goal/action
identification relative to positive affect. Similar
predictions have been made by theories that
propose that affect influences the process of
cognition (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2001;
Forgas, 2008). Like AIT and control theory, this
effect of mood on level of goal/action identifica-
tion is hypothesised to be adaptive in that it
matches the level of cognitive processing to
situational need (Beukeboom & Semin, 2005;
Bless, Schwarz, Clore, Golisano, & Rabe, 1996;
Forgas, 2008). Thus, if a happy mood is assumed
to signal goal progress, the absence of difficulties
or threats, and/or the presence of a benign
situation, it would be adaptive to rely on more
abstract identifications that maintain focus on
long-term goals in such a mood. Moreover,
engendering abstract representations may be ben-
eficial because they enable transfer of learning
from one situation to another (Fo¨rster & Higgins,
2005; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Conversely, if
a sad mood is assumed to signal a problematic
situation, then a shift to more concrete identifica-
tions in response to sadness would be adaptive
because concrete processing provides more con-
textual detail about the specific means and alter-
natives by which to proceed when faced with
difficult situations (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987)
and would reduce emotional vulnerability (Carver
& Scheier, 1990; Watkins et al., 2008).
There is considerable evidence consistent with
the hypothesis that different levels of goal/action
identifications have distinct functional effects,
with abstract identifications aiding long-term
goal pursuit, and concrete identifications more
adaptive in difficult circumstances. First, when
giving a speech, focusing on the concrete process
of giving the speech resulted in less anxiety and
less performance dissatisfaction when the task was
perceived to be difficult, whereas focusing on the
abstract purpose of the speech resulted in less
anxiety and less performance dissatisfaction when
the task was perceived to be easy (Vallacher,
Wegner, McMahan, Cotter, & Larsen, 1992;
Vallacher, Wegner, & Somoza, 1989). Second, a
concrete level of identification can facilitate
effective behavioural self-regulation by improving
problem solving (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002;
Watkins & Moulds, 2005a), and by focusing
attention on the immediate demands of the
present situation, and freeing up cognitive re-
sources (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1999; Webb & Sheeran,
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2003). Third, experimentally manipulating level
of goal/action identification influences emotional
response to a subsequent stress failure task
(Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins et al.,
2008), with more concrete identifications result-
ing in less emotional reactivity. Fourth, a habitual
tendency towards more abstract level of identifi-
cation is associated with more persistent and
stable behaviour, greater self-motivation, less
impulsiveness, and fewer action errors (Vallacher
& Wegner, 1989). Fifth, inducing an abstract
level of identification produces greater self-
control on experimental tasks than inducing
a concrete level of identification (Fujita,
Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006).
Watkins (2008, 2010) provides a fuller analysis of
the conditions under which abstract versus con-
crete levels of identification are adaptive versus
maladaptive.
Likewise, there is considerable evidence con-
sistent with the hypothesis that level of goal/
action identification shifts in response to circum-
stances including mood state. First, individuals
tend by default to use a more abstract level of
identification (Wegner & Vallacher, 1987;
Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986;
Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps,
1984), yet when faced with difficult, novel or
complex situations, people often move towards
more concrete identifications (Vallacher, Wegner,
& Frederick, 1987; Wegner et al., 1984). For
example, when given an unwieldy cup that made
drinking more difficult, participants tended to
provide more concrete descriptions of the act of
drinking than individuals given normal cups
(Wegner et al., 1984).
Second, there is extensive evidence supporting
the hypothesis that level of goal/action identifica-
tion shifts with mood. Happy mood is associated
with more global and abstract level of goal/action
identification, whereas sad mood is associated with
a more local, concrete level of goal/action identi-
fication that is more attentive to detailed, external
information (e.g., Beukeboom & Semin, 2005,
2006; Bless et al., 1996; Forgas, 2007; Forgas &
East, 2008; Gasper & Clore, 2002, Storbeck &
Clore, 2005). For example, Beukeboom and Semin
(2005) used the Behavioural Identification Form
(BIF), which presents participants with a list of
behaviours (e.g., ‘‘eating’’), and asks them to
endorse one of two subsequent descriptions differ-
ing in their level of action identification, e.g.,
‘‘getting nutrition’’ (abstract*why the action is
performed) versus ‘‘chewing and swallowing’’
(concrete*how the action is performed). Partici-
pants in a happy mood endorsed descriptions of
actions that were more abstract than participants
in a sad mood.
Thus, there is evidence in non-clinical research
samples that level of goal/action identification is
flexibly regulated in response to circumstances,
and, in particular, in response to mood state.
Consistent with control theory and AIT, non-
clinical participants adopt the level of goal/action
identification hypothesised to be most adaptive to
the current circumstances. Furthermore, there is
evidence consistent with the hypotheses that
different levels of goal/action identification have
distinct functional effects. Taken together, the
extant evidence suggests that level of goal/action
identification is adaptively regulated to circum-
stances in healthy controls.
However, there is at least one salient exception
to this hypothesised functional linkage between
affect and level of goal/action identification: the
level of identification adopted in clinical depression.
Rather than sad mood being associated with more
concrete identifications of events, goals, and
behaviours, mental representations of depressed
patients are instead characterised by overgenerali-
sation and abstraction for negative outcomes
(Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Carver, La
Voie, Kuhl, & Ganellen, 1988). Patients with
depression tend to overgeneralise from a single
negative event, such that a single failure is
represented in terms of a global and characterolo-
gical personal inadequacy (e.g., ‘‘I am worthless’’, a
highly abstract identification). Moreover, a recent
review (Watkins, 2008) has summarised evidence
that the pathological form of rumination, which
contributes to the onset and maintenance of
depression, is characterised by more abstract
identifications focused on the meanings and
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implications of negative events, and asking
‘‘Why?’’ negative events happen.
To account for this apparent inconsistency,
Watkins (2008, 2010) hypothesised that, in
depression-prone individuals (as well as anxiety-
prone individuals; Watkins, 2010), mood state is
less effective at shifting the level of identification
used to represent difficult events or actions and
negative circumstances. More specifically, this
level of identification dysregulation hypothesis pro-
poses that currently depressed individuals have an
impairment in flexibly regulating level of identi-
fication in response to situational demands,
and consequently are less likely to use increasingly
concrete representations in response to difficult
circumstances (i.e., situations in which there are
increases in sad mood and/or decreases in happy
mood). Critically, this hypothesis suggests that
major depression may be characterised by the
failure of the normal function for more negative
mood (whether increasing sad mood or decreasing
happy mood) to engender more concrete identi-
fications. This failure may result from cognitive
and motivational factors such as deficient execu-
tive/inhibitory control (Joormann, 2006) and
beliefs that it is important to understand feelings
and problems in more abstract terms (Watkins &
Moulds, 2005b). This analysis proposes that
despite the extreme and prolonged nature of the
mood disturbance in depression, including high
levels of sadness and low levels of happiness
(anhedonia), patients with major depression do
not adopt more concrete levels of identification in
response to negative circumstances. It is important
to note that theoretical models and previous
empirical studies (e.g., Beukeboom & Semin,
2005, which compared a happy mood induction
between-subject to a sad mood induction) leave
unresolved whether increases in sadness and/or
reductions in happiness are associated with the
shift in level of identification.
To date, studies of the effects of mood on the
abstraction of cognitive processing have been
conducted in non-clinical samples. The objective
of the present research was to directly test the
level of identification dysregulation hypothesis
with currently depressed and never-depressed
participants. Following a methodology similar to
Beukeboom and Semin (2005), we used Vallacher
and Wegner’s (1989) Behavioural Identification
Form to assess the level of identification adopted
following happy and sad mood inductions in
patients with major depression and never-
depressed controls. Elaborating on the findings
from Beukeboom and Semin (2005), we hypothe-
sised that in never-depressed controls there would
be a linear relationship between change in mood
from happy to sad mood inductions and change in
concreteness from happy to sad mood inductions,
i.e., we hypothesised that the extent of change in
identifications would be directly related to change
in mood state, such that for a greater change in
mood, there would be greater change in adoption
of concrete identifications. We therefore predicted
that identifications of behaviour would become
increasingly concrete as participants reported
increasing levels of sad mood and/or decreasing
levels of happy mood, thereby conceptually repli-
cating Beukeboom and Semin’s (2005, 2006)
findings using a within-subjects design. We used
a within-subjects design to examine the change in
concreteness and change in mood within each
individual between happy and sad mood induc-
tions, which allowed us to test this assumption
that there was a direct relationship between
degree of mood change and degree of identifica-
tion change with each participant acting as his/her
own control. However, we also predicted that this
association between change in mood and change
in level of identification would be weaker or
absent in currently depressed patients. Thus, we
predicted that the association between mood
change and shifts in level of identification would
be moderated by depression status. Given that
previous studies have not distinguished between
the effects of increasing sadness versus reducing
happiness in determining change in level of action
identification, we separately analysed both ratings
of sadness and happiness to explore whether the
change in level of identification was associated
with change in sadness and/or change in happi-
ness.
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METHOD
Participants
Participants were 23 individuals who met criteria
for major depression on the Structured Clinical
Interview for Diagnosis (SCID; First, Spitzer,
Gibbon, & Williams, 2002) and 23 controls who
had never experienced any psychiatric disorder
(see Table 1 for details). Some individuals in the
depressed group also met criteria for current
comorbid diagnoses, including generalised anxiety
disorder (n6), specific phobia (n5), social
phobia (n4), panic disorder (n4), posttrau-
matic stress disorder (n2), and dysthymia
(n1). Groups were matched for age and gender,
FsB1. Participants were recruited via community
notice boards and reimbursed £10 (US$16).
Measures and materials
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward,
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). The BDI
is a 21-item self-report scale that indexes the
presence and severity of depression symptoms over
the past week. The BDI possesses good psycho-
metric properties, with alpha coefficients of
.86 and .81 for psychiatric and non-psychiatric
populations respectively (Beck, Steer, & Garbin,
1988). In this sample, coefficient alpha was .94.
The depressed group scored significantly higher
on the BDI than controls, t(27.39)14.10,
pB.001 (degrees of freedom adjusted for unequal
variances).
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer,
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). The PSWQ
is a 16-item self-report scale assessing trait worry.
The scale has good psychometric properties and
successfully discriminates between individuals
with all, some, or none of the diagnostic criteria
for generalised anxiety disorder (Meyer et al.,
1990). In our sample, coefficient alpha was .92.
The depressed group scored significantly higher
on the PSWQ than controls, t(44)6.08,
pB.001.
Behavioural Identification Form (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1989). Two parallel versions of this
instrument were administered to assess level of
identification when describing behaviours. Each
form contains 17 behaviours (e.g., ‘‘eating’’), each
followed by a choice of two descriptions differing
in their level of action identification, e.g., ‘‘getting
nutrition’’ (abstract) versus ‘‘chewing and swallow-
ing’’ (concrete). Participants select the description
that they consider best describes the behaviour.
Table 1. Means (SDs) for demographics, mood ratings, and concrete completions pre- and post-induction for currently depressed and
never-depressed participants
Currently depressed Never depressed
Gender 12 females, 11 males 14 females, 9 males
Age 39.1 (12.0) 38.8 (14.1)
BDI 23.6 (6.8) 2.3 (2.4)
PSWQ 58.6 (9.6) 40.2 (10.9)
Sadness pre-happy induction 53.91 (18.27) 23.48 (23.08)
Sadness post-happy induction 35.65 (23.32) 7.61 (14.13)
Sadness pre-sad induction 48.70 (22.62) 13.91 (17.77)
Sadness post-sad induction 75.87 (17.62) 43.04 (27.87)
Happiness pre-happy induction 39.57 (16.09) 68.70 (18.66)
Happiness post-happy induction 63.04 (23.63) 84.57 (13.39)
Happiness pre-sad induction 45.87 (19.11) 72.83 (16.29)
Happiness post-sad induction 30.65 (18.35) 51.30 (25.81)
Concrete completions post-sad induction 6.43 (2.94) 6.29 (3.21)
Concrete completions post-happy induction 7.24 (2.43) 5.14 (2.63)
Note: BDIBeck Depression Inventory; PSWQPenn State Worry Questionnaire. Concrete completion is the number of selections of
concrete descriptions of the actions on the Behavioural Identification Form.
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Importantly, none of the behaviours relate to
depression or depressive symptoms. The total
number of concrete choices was summed to
provide a measure of concrete action identifica-
tion.
Mood ratings. Visual analogue scales were used
to measure mood pre- and post-mood induction.
Participants rated the degree to which they felt
sad and happy respectively on two 0100 scales,
where 0 ‘‘I do not feel at all sad [happy]’’ and
100 ‘‘I feel extremely sad [happy]’’. Correlations
between sad and happy items at each assessment
were high (rs between.70 and.84, all
psB.001).
Design and procedure
In summary, participants were administered a
mood induction (happy or sad), and then com-
pleted one form of the Behavioural Identification
Form (Form A or B). The procedure was then
repeated; that is, a second (alternate) mood
induction was delivered, followed by the comple-
tion of the alternate version of the Behavioural
Identification Form. Both the order of the mood
inductions (happy, sad) and the order of delivery
of the two versions of the Behavioural Identifica-
tion Form (Form A, form B) were counter-
balanced. As such, participants completed the
procedure in one of four possible (randomised)
sequences; namely: (i) happy induction, Form A;
sad induction, Form B; (ii) happy induction,
Form B; sad induction, Form A; (iii) sad
induction, Form A; happy induction, Form B;
or (iv) sad induction, Form B; happy induction,
Form A.
After arriving at the laboratory and giving
informed consent, participants completed the
mood ratings to provide baseline measures.
Next, in order to induce mood, participants were
then instructed to recall either a happy or a sad
memory, as follows:
I would now like you to think about a very happy [sad]
memory. For the next few minutes, I would like you to
close your eyes and focus your attention on that
memory. Think about what happened, who was with
you, and what your thoughts and feelings were at the
time. Try to picture the memory as clearly as possible.
Keep the memory in your mind until I tell you to open
your eyes.
Participants were instructed to think about the
memory without verbalisation, although they were
asked for a brief description of the memory on
completion of the task to ensure that an appro-
priately valenced memory had been recalled. Mood
ratings were then administered again, before
participants completed the parallel version of the
Behavioural Identification Form, and then com-
pleted filler tasks for 30 minutes. We then
repeated the procedure with the remaining mood
induction, i.e., participants rated their mood,
recalled a second memory (of opposite valence to
the first memory), re-rated their mood, and
completed the alternate version of the Behavioural
Identification Form. Finally, participants were
debriefed and reimbursed.
RESULTS
Effectiveness of mood manipulation
We examined the effectiveness of the mood
manipulations by conducting separate repeated-
measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs),
with Induction (happy vs. sad) and Time (pre-
induction vs. post-induction) as the within-
subjects variables, Group (currently depressed vs.
never-depressed) and Order of mood induction
(happy-then-sad vs. sad-then-happy) as the be-
tween-subjects variables, and with ratings of
sadness and happiness respectively as the depen-
dent variables.
When the rating of sadness was the dependent
variable, significant main effects of Group and
Induction indicated that currently depressed
participants reported greater sadness than never-
depressed participants, F(1, 42)37.29,
MSE44,814.71, pB.001, hp2.47, and that
the sad mood induction (pre- and post-induction
scores) was associated with greater sadness than the
happy mood induction, F(1, 42)69.33,
MSE10,752.61, pB.001, hp2.62. Crucially,
the Time  Induction interaction was significant,
F(1, 42)88.49, MSE23,810.36, pB.001,
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hp2.68. As can be seen in Table 1, sadness
increased from before to after the sad mood
induction, t(45)9.13, pB.001, but decreased
from before to after the happy mood induction,
t(45)5.81, pB.001. This pattern was not mod-
erated by group status (TimeInductionGroup
interaction: FB1), or mood induction order
(TimeInductionMood Induction Order in-
teraction: FB1).
When the rating of happiness was the dependent
variable, significant main effects of Group and
Induction indicated that currently depressed
participants reported less happiness than never-
depressed participants, F(1, 42)30.24,
MSE3,325.61, pB.001, hp2.42, and that the
happy mood induction (pre- and post-induction
scores) was associated with greater happiness than
the sad mood induction, F(1, 42)37.68,
MSE8,713.03, pB.001, hp2.47. Crucially,
the TimeInduction interaction was significant,
F(1, 42)79.65, MSE16,600.79, pB.001,
hp2.65. As can be seen in Table 1, happiness
increased from before to after the happy mood
induction, t(45)7.03, pB.001, but decreased
from before to after the sad mood induction,
t(45)6.80, pB.001. This pattern was not mod-
erated by group status (TimeInductionGroup
interaction: FB1), or mood induction order
(TimeInductionMood Induction Order in-
teraction: FB1). Thus, the mood inductions were
therefore similarly effective for both groups and in
both orders of administration, and on both self-
report ratings of mood status.
Change in level of identification with
changing mood
The level of identification dysregulation hypothesis
predicts that healthy individuals, but not de-
pressed individuals, will use increasingly concrete
identifications of goals and actions as their mood
becomes sadder and/or less happy. To test this
hypothesis, we first calculated three change
scores. Change in concrete identification indexed
the extent to which participants gave more
concrete responses on the Behavioural Identifica-
tion Form after the sad mood induction than
after the happy mood induction. Paralleling our
assessment points for concreteness of identifica-
tion, change in sadness indexed the extent to
which participants reported greater sadness after
the sad mood induction than after the happy
mood induction, and change in happiness in-
dexed the extent to which participants reported
less happiness after the sad mood induction than
after the happy mood induction. We then
conducted hierarchical regression analyses in
which change in concrete identification was
regressed on group (0never-depressed, 1
currently depressed) and change in sadness or
happiness in the first step, and then additionally
on the interaction between group and change in
mood in the second step. Change in mood was
mean-centred prior to analysis.2 The level of
identification dysregulation hypothesis predicts that
there should be a significant interaction between
group and change in mood in predicting change
in concrete identification.
Separate regression analyses were calculated for
change in happiness and change in sadness. For
the happiness rating, in the first step of the
regression analysis, a significant coefficient
emerged for change in happiness, indicating that
the greater the decrease in happiness from post-
happy to post-sad mood induction, the greater the
shift towards more concrete identification,
b0.34, t(43)2.42, pB.05. Controlling
for change in happiness, group was not associated
with change in identification, b0.21,
t(43)1.48, ns. These two variables explained
12% of the variance in change in concrete level of
identification, F(2, 43)4.08, MSE37.00,
pB.05. Crucially, in the second step, the inter-
action between group and change in happiness
was significant, b0.55, t(42)2.87, pB.01.
This interaction explained a further 13% of the
variance in change in concrete identification, and
2 Order of induction and order of BIF form did not significantly moderate the results found in the regression, and are thus not
reported further.
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the overall model remained significant, F(3,
42)5.93, MSE46.04, p.001. As shown in
Figure 1, and consistent with predictions, the
significant interaction indicates that the extent to
which participants use more concrete identifica-
tion with reducing happiness was moderated by
depression status. For never-depressed partici-
pants, greater reductions in happiness were asso-
ciated with greater shifts towards the use of more
concrete identification, r(21).66, pB.001.
However, for currently depressed participants,
there was no significant relationship between
change in happiness and change in concrete
identification, r(21).00, ns.
For the sadness rating, in the first step of the
regression analysis, there was not a significant
coefficient for change in sadness, b0.23,
t(43)1.58, p.12. Controlling for change in
sadness, group was not associated with change in
identification, b0.23, t(43)1.60, p.12.
These two variables explained 6% of the variance
in change in concrete identification, F(2,
43)2.33, MSE22.66, p.11. Crucially, in
the second step, the interaction between group and
change in sadness was significant, b0.57,
t(42)3.07, pB.005. This interaction explained
a further 15% of the variance in change in concrete
identification, and the overall model was signifi-
cant, F(3, 42)5.00, MSE40.76, p.005.
Consistent with predictions, the significant inter-
action indicates that the extent to which partici-
pants use more concrete identification with
increasing sadness was moderated by depression
status. For never-depressed participants, greater
increases in sadness were associated with greater
shifts towards the use of more concrete identifica-
tions, r(21).59, pB.001. However, for currently
depressed participants, there was no significant
relationship between change in sadness and change
in concrete identification, r(21) .22, p.32
(see Figure 2).3
DISCUSSION
Our results support previous findings that mood
influences cognitive processing in healthy con-
trols. To the extent that participants’ mood
became less happy and/or more sad, descriptions
of behaviours became more concrete, more
focused on ‘‘how’’ to implement the behaviour,
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
Low (–1SD) High (+1SD)
Currently depressed
Never depressed
Figure 1. Increase in concrete level of identification with low
versus high decrease in happiness in currently depressed and never
depressed participants.
3 An alternative analysis is to conduct a 2 (Group: depressed vs. control)2 (Level of identification post-happy induction vs.
Level of identification post-sad induction) ANOVA on the concreteness of choices on the Behavioural Identification Form. We
note that such an analysis is less sensitive than the initial regression analysis because it does not account for the within-subject
relationship between change in mood and change in level of action identification. Thus, it is not sensitive to one individual showing
a large degree of mood change and another individual showing no mood change, which is hypothesised to impact the degree to
which within any individual their level of action identification changes. Because a difference in mood state between the post-happy
induction and the post-sad induction is a requirement for testing the effect of mood on level of identification, we excluded those
participants who did not differ on ratings of sadness or happiness between the two mood inductions (2 in depressed group, 2 in
control group). There was a significant interaction of Group by Induction, F(1, 40)4.13, pB.05, hp2 .09, replicating the
pattern of findings from the regression analysis, i.e., identification is more concrete post-sad induction than post-happy induction
for the never-depressed controls but not for the depressed patients. There was no main effect of Induction, F(1, 40)0.12, nor of
Group, F(1, 40)2.38, p.13, hp2 .06, indicating that in general depressed patients were not more abstract nor more concrete
than controls.
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and less focused on ‘‘why’’ one carries out the
behaviour. This finding conceptually replicates
Beukeboom and Semin’s (2005, 2006) results
using a within-subject comparison of happy versus
sad mood states, rather than their between-subject
comparison. Moreover, these findings further
strengthen the proposal that there is a direct
relationship between change in mood and change
in concrete level of identification, indicating a
linear relationship between mood and level of
identification in healthy controls. Consistent with
the level of identification dysregulation hypothesis
(Watkins, 2008, 2010), this association between
change in mood and change in level of identifica-
tion was moderated by depression status: unlike
never-depressed individuals, depressed individuals
did not shift towards using more concrete identi-
fications as their mood became sadder and less
happy. These findings suggest that a normal and
potentially adaptive function of mood on cogni-
tive processing*the calibration of level of identi-
fication to situational demands as hypothesised
within control theory and AIT*is impaired in
individuals with depression.
We note that the current findings suggest that
increases in sadness and reductions in happiness
have equivalent effects on change in level of goal/
action identification, with both being positively
correlated with increases in concreteness, in the
non-depressed controls. In addition, there was no
overall group difference in level of identification
between the depressed patients and the control
group. While superficially this appears at odds
with the hypothesis that depressed patients are
more abstract than controls, there are several
reasons to be cautious about such an interpreta-
tion. First, the level of identification was only
assessed after a mood induction, such that there
was no assessment of the baseline or default
response for either depressed participants or
non-depressed controls. Second, the items in the
Behavioural Identification Form describe rela-
tively neutral to mildly positive events, rather
than events that are negatively valenced. This is
important because, as noted earlier, depression is
specifically characterised by abstraction to nega-
tive events and outcomes. Thus, the materials
used in the current study do not provide a good
test of whether depressed patients, compared to
never-depressed controls, have a tendency towards
abstraction to negative events. Rather, the materi-
als and design are appropriate for the goal of the
study, which was to build on the work of
Beukeboom and Semin (2005) by testing whether
changes in mood state influence the adoption of
level of identification differentially in depressed
patients versus non-depressed controls. Third, this
lack of a group difference in level of identification
occurred in the context of the depressed group
having significantly higher levels of sadness and
significantly lower levels of happiness than the
never-depressed controls. This pattern of findings,
coupled with the finding that change in mood is
not related to change in identification in the
depressed group, is consistent with the hypothesis
that mood state has less impact on level of action
identification in depressed patients.
Disruption of the hypothesised functional
linkage between mood and level of identification
means that, despite experiencing persistent and
exacerbated negative mood, a depressed individual
may not derive the potential benefits of concrete
processing on problem solving, planning, focused
attention, and reduced emotional response, when
faced with a loss or difficulty. As such, this
disruption could contribute to the onset and
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
Low (–1SD) High (+1SD)
Currently depressed
Never depressed
Figure 2. Increase in concrete level of identification with low
versus high increase in sadness in currently depressed and never
depressed participants.
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maintenance of depression, as shifts to more
concrete level of identification may reduce the
underlying problems that cause the sad mood (or
reduction in happy mood) and thereby potentially
limit its duration. Moreover, a tendency to
maintain more abstract processing when faced
with difficult events, setbacks, and losses may
make individuals more vulnerable to making
negative overgeneralisations and more prone to
rumination, both of which are implicated in the
onset and development of depression (Watkins,
2008, 2010). Thus, dysregulation of the relation-
ship between mood and level of identification may
have far-reaching consequences for psychological
health, by conferring vulnerability for future
depression.
If this speculation is correct, it raises the
possibility that for depressed patients, it may be
beneficial to encourage a concrete level of goal/
action identification to negative outcomes (e.g.,
focus on how an event happened and how a goal
could be pursued for depressed patients when
ruminating) in order to reduce depressive symp-
toms. Interestingly, CBT treatments involve a
number of techniques that involve promoting a
shift towards a concrete level of goal/action
identification (e.g., detailed Socratic questioning,
situational analysis, detailed activity scheduling,
breaking down tasks into steps). Consistent with
this analysis, a recently developed treatment for
rumination, which has encouraging preliminary
results, explicitly coaches ruminators to shift away
from their predominant abstract level of goal/
action identification to adopt a more concrete
level of goal/action identification during self-focus
(Watkins et al., 2007). Furthermore, an interven-
tion designed to train depressed individuals to be
more concrete when faced with difficulties in-
volved repeated practice at asking ‘‘How?’’ and
focusing on specific details, and reduced depres-
sion, rumination, and anxiety relative to a no-
training control in a proof-of-principle study
(Watkins, Baeyens, & Read, 2009).
These results may also provide a potential
account for the observation that depressed in-
dividuals are unresponsive to their communication
partners, violate communication norms, and do
not meet the demands of the communication
situation. The ability to fine tune cognitive
processes such as the level of identification
adopted in response to affective signals and
conversational demands is considered an impor-
tant ability in effective communication, with
speakers becoming more abstract in response to
positive affective expressions of listeners that
indicate understanding but becoming more con-
crete in response to negative affective expressions
that suggest criticism or misunderstanding
(Beukeboom, 2009). However, the potential
breakdown of the relationship between mood
and level of identification in depression may
mean that depressed patients are less able to adapt
their communication to situational demands,
leading to poor communication.
These results provide further insight into the
variables that influence how individuals construe
and represent events and behaviours. The level of
identification adopted when representing goals,
events, and behaviours is important in many
aspects of cognitive and social functioning,
and has been shown to guide prediction, evalua-
tion, and behaviour (e.g., Trope, Liberman, &
Wakslak, 2007). A number of dimensions influ-
ence level of identification, including mood state
(Beukeboom & Semin, 2005), novelty and un-
familiarity (Vallacher et al., 1987; Wegner et al.,
1984) and psychological distance, such that great-
er temporal distance, spatial distance, social dis-
tance and reduced probability all produce more
abstract level of identifications (see Trope et al.,
2007, for a review). Our findings add a further
factor, depression status, which moderates the
effect of one of these dimensions, namely mood,
on level of identification. It remains unknown
whether depression status moderates the effects of
any of these other dimensions on level of
identification. Future research needs to determine
the relative contributions, causal directions, and
dependence/independence of all these dimensions
on identification level.
This study has a number of limitations. First,
we cannot disentangle whether the impaired
relationship between mood and level of level of
identification in depression is a state effect due
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to an individual’s current symptoms of depression
or a trait effect that reflects underlying processes
involved in depression that persist after recovery.
Watkins (2008, 2010) proposed that level of
identification dysregulation is a trait phenomen-
on that is associated with proneness to depres-
sion, rather than a state phenomenon that
reflects the presence of a current depressive
episode. Second, our use of currently depressed
patients as the only clinical group means that it
is not possible to determine from these studies if
the level of identification dysregulation is specific
to depression or whether it is associated with
other psychopathology. The inclusion of other
psychological disorders in future research would
help to clarify this issue. We note that our
current sample is best characterised as patients
with depression and comorbid anxiety, and, thus,
a cautious conclusion is that the level of
identification dysregulation effect only applies
to this particular group. However, it is important
to recognise that the presence of comorbid
anxiety is the norm in patients with major
depression and thus our sample is characteristic
of the clinical presentation of depressed clients.
Moreover, the level of identification dysregula-
tion hypothesis was derived from considerations
of pathological repetitive thought, including
depressive rumination and worry (Watkins,
2008), and predicts that not only depression
but other psychological disorders characterised by
pathological repetitive thought (e.g., anxiety
disorders) would demonstrate this dysregulation
(Watkins, 2010). As such, finding the effect in
the current sample is consistent with the hypoth-
esis. Third, we only used one measure of level of
identification: the Behavioural Identification
Form. This was an appropriate instrument given
that it has been successfully used to demonstrate
the effect of mood on level of action identifica-
tion by Beukeboom and Semin (2005, 2006), and
has been repeatedly shown to be sensitive to
manipulations of level of abstraction in the
action identification and construal theory litera-
ture (e.g., Fujita et al., 2006, Study 1). None-
theless, increased confidence in these results
would be afforded by their replication using
alternative means to assess level of identification
such as semantic classification of participant-
generated descriptions or differences in categor-
isation (Stapel & Semin, 2007). Finally, we used
inductions to manipulate sad mood versus happy
mood, but it is unclear whether similar group
differences on change in level of identification
would be obtained for manipulations of other
negative moods, such as anger.
In conclusion, these studies confirm that mood
regulates level of identification, consistent with
the findings of Beukeboom and Semin (2005), but
suggest that this effect is impaired in currently
depressed individuals. These results are consistent
with Watkins’ (2008, 2010) level of identification
dysregulation hypothesis, which proposes that
depressed individuals are compromised in their
ability to regulate their level of goal/action
identification in response to situational demands
such that they show a reduced shift towards more
concrete representations in response to increasing
sadness or reducing happiness. Importantly, these
results suggest that clinical depression may be
characterised by the failure of the normal and
adaptive function of mood to engender more
concrete identifications in order to deal with
difficult situations. More generally, our findings
raise the possibility that it may not always be
appropriate to assume that the cognitive conse-
quences of sadness or reduced happiness in non-
depressed individuals are analogous to those in
patients with clinical depression.
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